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Abstract This opinion analyzes the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case Kirtsaeng v. Wiley & Sons. In this decision, the Court ruled that
the principle of copyright exhaustion as provided in Section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act equally applies to products ‘‘lawfully made’’ in the United States as well as to
products that have been ‘‘lawfully made’’ in foreign countries. This ‘‘revolutionary’’
decision came after almost two decades of conflicting positions, including two
previous Supreme Court decisions that had failed to clarify the issue, notably
Quality King v. L’anza and Costco v. Omega. Yet, a closer look at the decision,
particularly at the concurring and dissenting opinions in the case, seems to show that
Supreme Court’s position may have been a necessary step that the Court had to take
in order to redress the ambiguities that continued to linger on the issue, especially in
light of the additional uncertainty that the Court itself had injected into the inter-
pretation of Section 109(a) with its decision in Quality King. Accordingly, more
chapters may be awaiting to be written in this American saga on the territorial
application of the principle of copyright exhaustion. As the concurring opinion in
the case directly suggested, Congress could overrule the Supreme Court and clarify
with a legislative amendment that the application of copyright exhaustion in the
United States is not international but instead national exhaustion for all products.
Calls for copyright reforms not surprisingly, started just days after the decision in
Kirtsaeng. Furthermore, even if the Court’s decision would survive future reforms,
copyright owners continue to have alternative means, such as contractual clauses
I. Calboli (&)
Dr. jur. (Bologna); LL.M. (London); Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School (United
States); Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore (Singapore); Fellow,
Transatlantic Technology Law Forum, Stanford Law School, Standford, USA
Stanford Law School, 2631 East Shorewood Blvd., Shorewood, WI 53211, USA
e-mail: irene.calboli@gmail.com
123
IIC (2014) 45:75–90
DOI 10.1007/s40319-013-0146-y
Author's personal copy
The final publication is available at link.springer.com
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40319-013-0146-y
and technical measures, to largely reduce the positive effects of the decision for
international trade.
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1 Introduction
On March 19, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its much awaited
decision in Kirtsaeng v. Wiley & Sons.1 To the joy of parallel importers, and the
despair of copyright owners, the Court ruled that the principle of copyright
exhaustion (or copyright first sale) as provided in Section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act equally applies to products ‘‘lawfully made’’ in the United States as well as to
products that have been ‘‘lawfully made’’ in foreign countries, and that copyright
owners cannot turn to Section 602(1)(a) to prevent the importation of the products
that have been ‘‘lawfully made’’ in foreign countries and were later imported into
the United States. The decision came after almost two decades of conflicting
positions, repeated litigation, judicial splits among different courts of appeals, and
two previous Supreme Court decisions that failed to clarify the issue, notably the
Court’s decisions in Quality King v. L’anza and Costco v. Omega.2 Until Kirtsaeng,
many thought that the United States followed a principle of national copyright
exhaustion, but Kirstsaeng clarified that genuine (non-counterfeit) copyrighted
products can legitimately be imported, or reimported, into the United States – in
other words, that the United States follows a principle of international copyright
exhaustion.3
Undoubtedly, the decision in Kirtsaeng represents one of the most relevant,
perhaps revolutionary, copyright decisions of recent decades. Yet, a closer look at it,
particularly at the concurring4 and dissenting5 opinions in the case, seems to show
that the decision perhaps represented a necessary step that the Supreme Court had to
take in order to redress the ambiguities that continued to linger in the interpretation
of the legislative text of Sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a), especially in light of the
additional uncertainty that the Court itself had injected into the interpretation of
these provisions with its decision in Quality King. In that decision, the Court
1 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013). See 44 IIC 472 (2013), doi:10.1007/
s40319-013-0048-z.
2 See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l., Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998); Costco Wholesale
Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S.Ct. 565 (2011).
3 For a detailed analysis of the pre-Kirtsaeng ambiguities in the interpretation of the principle of
copyright exhaustion in the United States, see Irene Calboli, ‘‘An American Tale: The Unclear
Application of the First Sale Rule in United States Copyright Law (and Its Impact on International
Trade)’’, in Jan Rosen (ed.) Intellectual Property at the Crossroads of Trade p. 67 (2012) [hereinafter
Calboli, ‘‘First Sale Rule in Copyright Law’’]; Irene Calboli, ‘‘Corporate Strategies, First Sale Rules, and
Copyright Misuse: Waiting for Answers from Kirtsaeng v. Wiley and Omega v. Costco (II)’’, 11 NW.
J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 221, 227 (2013) [hereinafter Calboli, ‘‘Corporate Strategies’’].
4 Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1372 (Kagan J. concurring).
5 Id. at 1384 (Ginsburg J. dissenting).
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supported that the language ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ in Section 109(a) should
be interpreted as ‘‘lawfully made in the United States.’’6 This position, however,
discriminated between products imported in the United States based on the national
origin of the products and, almost paradoxically, favored foreign-made products (not
subject to copyright exhaustion) against domestically made ones (subject to
exhaustion). Not surprisingly, this position was untenable in a globalized economy,
and the decision in Kirtsaeng resolved this product discrimination by stating that
Section 109(a) equally applies to all products regardless of the place of manufacture.
Hence, the decision of the Supreme Court may not be the end of the American saga on
the territorial application of Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act.7 Notably, as the same
concurring opinion in the Kirtsaeng case seemed to advocate, Congress could
ultimately overrule the Supreme Court and reinstate, with a legislative amendment, a
system of national copyright exhaustion, this time for all products – nationally- and
foreign-made. Interestingly, just one day after the decision in Kirtsaeng was issued,
calls for copyright reforms were made by the United States Register for Copyright,8 and
a few weeks later, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee followed course and
announced the possibility of an overall revision of the copyright system in the United
States.9 Accordingly, more discussion and perhaps a legislative amendment in this area
cannot be excluded at this time.
In this Opinion, I recount the saga of the interpretation of the territorial
application of the principle of copyright exhaustion in the United States before and
after the decision in Kirtsaeng. In particular, in Part 2, I address the ambiguities that
characterized the principle of copyright exhaustion in the United States before
Kirtsaeng. In Part 3, I analyze the opinion of the majority in the case, and highlight
that the position taken by the majority was likely a step that the Court had to take to
untangle the post-Quality King confusing interpretation of Sections 109(a) and
602(1)(a). In Part 4, I turn to the concurring and dissenting opinions in Kirtsaeng
and underscore how the concurring Justices seemed to advocate that Congress
revisit the issue and (re)turn to a system of national copyright exhaustion. In this
Part, I additionally stress that the dissenting opinion in Kirtsaeng correctly pointed
out that national copyright exhaustion was the official position supported by the
United States with respect to the Agreements on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and most recently with respect to international
free trade agreements (FTAs), which reinforces the possibility of a legislative shift
back to a system of national exhaustion. In Part 5, I conclude by highlighting that
even if the decision would survive the ongoing copyright reforms, copyright owners
may turn to alternative stratagems to control product distribution in the international
marketplace, and thus largely reduce, in practice, the positive effects of the Supreme
Court’s decision for international free trade.
6 Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152 (stating that the right to ‘‘sell or otherwise dispose of’’ an item includes
the right to ship an item abroad and that, in turn, importation constitutes a first sale under the language of
Sec. 109(a) of the Copyright Act).
7 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1372 (2013) (Kagan J. concurring).
8 See discussion infra Part 4.
9 Id.
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2 The Pre-Kirtsaeng Territorial Mess in United States Copyright Exhaustion
As I described in detail before,10 the interpretation of the territorial application of the
principle of copyright exhaustion in the United States was not clearly settled until the
decision in Kirtsaeng. Historically, the debut of the principle of copyright exhaustion
dates back to the Supreme Court decision in Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus in 1908, where the
Court stated that ‘‘the purchaser of a book, once sold by the authority of the owner of
the copyright, may sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it.’’11
One year later, this principle was codified in the Copyright Act of 1909, under which
‘‘the exclusive [right] to ‘vend’ [a copy of a work] was limited to the first sale of the
[copy of the] work.’’12 Under the rule of the Copyright Act of 1909, the application of
the principle of exhaustion did not seem to be limited to the sales made in the national
territory; at least the statute did not provide any specific provision in this respect. In
1976, when the current version of the Copyright Act was adopted, Congress confirmed
the principle of copyright exhaustion in Section 109(a), which states that the owner of
a copyrighted work ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ is entitled ‘‘to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that [work]’’ without ‘‘the authority of the copyright
owner.’’13 Here again, Congress did not clarify, in the text of Section 109(a), the
territorial application of the principle of copyright exhaustion. Yet, Congress
introduced a new provision, Section 602(1)(a), in the Copyright Act, which provides
that ‘‘the importation into the United States’’ of a copyrighted work acquired outside
the United States ‘‘without the authority of the [copyright]owner’’ is ‘‘an infringement
of the exclusive right [of] distribut[ion].’’14 To many courts, including to some of the
Supreme Court Justices, the adoption of this provision meant that the United States had
opted for a system of national copyright exhaustion, in which copyright owners could
invoke Section 602(1)(a) to prevent the unauthorized importation of gray market
products.15
This interpretation, however, was not shared unanimously and, until the Supreme
Court decision in Kirtsaeng, courts, lawyers, and businesses continued to fight over
the correct interpretation of the combined language of Sections 109(a) and
602(1)(a) of the Copyright Act – notably whether Section 602(1)(a) limited the
scope of Section 109(a) or vice versa. Because of the considerable interests at stake
for the various parties, such conflicts did not come as a surprise.16 Generally, on one
10 This Part summarizes the pre-Kirtsaeng analysis of the territorial application of the principle of
copyright exhaustion that I elaborated in Calboli, ‘‘First Sale Rule in Copyright Law’’, supra note 3, at 67;
and Calboli, ‘‘Corporate Strategies’’, supra note 3, at 225. Accordingly portions of this Part borrow from
those earlier publications.
11 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908).
12 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l., Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141–42 (1998) (‘‘Congress
subsequently codified our holding in Bobbs-Merrill that the exclusive right to ‘vend’ was limited to first
sale of the work.’’).
13 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
14 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1).
15 See, e.g., Quality King, 523 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg J. concurring).
16 For a detailed description of the various interests at stake with respect to gray market products, see
Heath (1997), Cohen Jehoram (1999), Worth (1994).
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side, copyright owners aim to strictly control product distribution and pricing in foreign
markets, thus they naturally oppose gray market products because they fear the
competition and resulting disruption of product pricing strategies (and loss of profits)
that gray market products can create in the markets where these products are imported.
Because of this, copyright owners traditionally argued that the language of
Section 602(1)(a) forbids the importation of gray market products into the United
States and that Section 109(a) does not apply to unauthorized imports. On the other
side, wholesalers, many distributors, and retailers generally favor gray market
products, as these businesses trade in these products and benefit directly from the
competitive advantage that the lower price of gray market products offers them,
compared to the higher price of the (same) products distributed under the authorization
of copyright owners. Accordingly, these businesses generally argued that the
importation right provided in Section 602(1)(a) does not limit the application of
Section 109(a) to foreign imports of genuine products. Instead, they supported that it is
Section 109(a) which limits Section 602(1)(a), and that the principle of copyright
exhaustion extends to all ‘‘lawfully made’’ (i.e. genuine) products, regardless of the
actual place where these products have been first sold in the global market. In particular,
they underscored that, because Section 602(1)(a) is an extension of the rights granted to
copyright owners under Section 106 and Section 109(a) limits the scope of
Section 106, the language of Section 109(a) should thus be interpreted as limiting
the scope of Section 602(1)(a).17 On their side, consumer associations also favored the
admissibility of gray market products due to the additional consumer choices and
generally lower prices that these products bring about for consumers.
Among the judiciary, the most vocal supporter of an ‘‘international’’ reading of
Section 109(a) pre-Kirtsaeng was the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third
Circuit). Notably, in its 1988 decision in Sebastian International v. Consumer Contacts,
the Third Circuit adopted the position that the ‘‘first sale by the copyright owner
extinguishes any right later to control importation of those copies regardless of the place
of sale’’18 because copyright owners are already rewarded for their work in creating the
copyrighted articles upon the first sale of these articles regardless of the geographical
location of the place of sale.19 The Third Circuit additionally noted that the Copyright
Act did not state that the copyright owners who sell copies abroad should be rewarded
more (by not having to be subject to the first sale rule) than copyright owners who sell
domestically.20 The Third Circuit’s position, however, remained isolated.21 In contrast,
17 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
18 Id. at 1099.
19 Id. 1096–7 [quoting Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa.
1964)].
20 Id. (stressing that if Sec. 109(a) applied only to copies sold in the US, copyright owners selling copies
abroad would receive a purchase price and a right to limit importation, whereas copyright owners selling
copies domestically would only receive the purchase price).
21 Prior to the Third Circuit’s decision in Sebastian, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania had interpreted the ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ language of Sec. 109(a) of the
Copyright Act to mean ‘‘lawfully made in the United States.’’ The Third Circuit affirmed the decision
without opinion. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc. 569 F. Supp. 47,
50 (E.D. Pa. 1983) aff’d without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
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the other courts that confronted the issue generally supported the opposite view. In
particular, the Ninth Circuit repeated in a line of cases that the first sale rule in copyright
law applied only to domestic sales of copyrighted products and not to unauthorized
imports. Specifically, in 1991, in BMG Music v. Perez, the Ninth Circuit held that
Section 109(a) exhausts the distribution right of copyright owners only if the first sale
occurred in the United States and construed the ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’
language of Section 109(a) to exclude copyrighted copies sold in foreign countries.22
In 1994, in Parfums Givenchy v. Drug Emporium, the Ninth Circuit confirmed this
interpretation and underscored that, should a different interpretation be given to the
statutory language, it would amount ‘‘to deprive the US copyright holder of the power to
authorize or prevent imports of the copies once the copies are sold abroad.’’23 Yet, the
Ninth Circuit also conceded that, while copyright owners could prevent unauthorized
imports until there has been a ‘‘first authorized sale’’ in the United States, they could not
further control the circulation of their copyrighted products after that first authorized
sale had taken place in the United States.24 The Ninth Circuit confirmed this position
again in L’anza v. Quality King in 199625 and Omega v. Costco in 2008.26
Because of the circuit split between the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, the
Supreme Court decided to grant certiorari in Quality King.27 Yet, the 1998 Court’s
ruling in that case ultimately complicated the issue rather than clarifying it. The
facts in the case also did not assist, as Quality King was a case about copyrighted
products that had been made and first sold in the United States, then exported
abroad, and later re-imported into the country against the will of copyright owner
L’anza. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the distributor, Quality King, finding
that the copyright in the products had been exhausted and that the imports were not
infringing. Hence, the Court reached this conclusion only because the products were
made and had first been sold in the United States28 – in other words,
Section 602(1)(a) did not apply to the case because this was a ‘‘round trip’’ for
domestically, and thus lawfully made products under Section 109(a). In reaching its
conclusion, the Court did not explicitly address, however, the territorial application
of Section 109(a) and the interplay between Sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a) for all
gray market products, in particular for those made and first sold abroad and only
later imported into the United States.29 Absent such important clarification, many
read the decision as confirming that the United States was following a system of
national copyright exhaustion, at least with respect to products that were made and
first distributed abroad. Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority precisely on
the premise that the language ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ meant ‘‘lawfully
22 BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991).
23 Parfums Givenchy, Inc., v. Drug Emporium, 38 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1994).
24 Id. at 482–3.
25 L’anza Research Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996).
26 Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008).
27 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
28 Id. at 139.
29 See generally Calboli, ‘‘First Sale Rule in Copyright Law’’, supra note 3, at 79 (highlighting that the
‘‘Supreme Court fell short of addressing the territorial extent of the first sale rule in copyright law’’).
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made in the United States.’’30 Yet, as criticized by many, such reading of the statute
implied that Section 109(a) would not apply to foreign manufactured goods, even
after these goods had been distributed in the United States under the authority of the
copyright owners. In 2010, amidst growing confusion post-Quality King, the
Supreme Court attempted again to clarify the issue by granting certiorari in Costco
v. Omega,31 a case involving gray market watches manufactured and first distributed
in Europe and later imported into the United States. Still, the interpretation of
Section 109(a) continued to prove so divisive that, despite the trepidation of
copyright owners, parallel importers, and consumer associations, the Court did not
even reach any decision this time. With the newly appointed Justice Kagan recusing
herself due to her previous involvement in the case as Solicitor General, the
remaining Justices divided equally 4-4 and affirmed, in a nine-word per curiam
decision without explanation,32 the decision on appeal. As a result, after Costco, the
interpretation favoring the position that the United States followed a principle of
national copyright exhaustion continued to be prevalent.
3 The Inevitability of the Majority Decision in Kirtsaeng
It was not long, however, until the same issue was brought again in front of the
courts in the case that later became known as Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons.33
This time, the case concerned gray market books printed in Asia and imported from
Thailand. Arriving from Thailand in 1997 to study at Cornell University, Thai
citizen Mr. Supap Kirtsaeng decided to subsidize the cost of his education by asking
friends and family to purchase copies of textbooks in Thailand, where the prices of
books were considerably lower than in the Unites States, and ship the books to him
in the United States. Once the books arrived in the United States, Mr. Kirtsaeng
resold them on commercial websites such as eBay. Among the books that Mr.
Kirtsaeng sold were eight books printed in Asia by a subsidiary of John Wiley &
Sons (Wiley). Obviously unhappy with the happenings (and the profits made by Mr.
Kirtsaeng), Wiley sued Mr. Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement based upon the
violation of the importation right as per Section 602(1)(a). Hence, Mr. Kirtsaeng
counter-argued that the books were not a violation of the importation right, but were
instead ‘‘lawfully made’’ products in accordance with Section 109(a) of the
Copyright Act, and thus he could import and resell them in the United States
without the need of Wiley’s further consent. Despite this argument, both the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York on first instance and the
30 Quality King, 523 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg J. concurring) (citing William F. Patry, Copyright Law and
Practice (1997 Supp.) pp. 166–70 and 10; Paul Goldstein, Copyright (2d edn. 1998) Sec. 16.0,
16:1–16:2).
31 Costco Wholesale Corp. v Omega, S.A., 131 S.Ct. 565 (2010).
32 Id.
33 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013). This Part incorporates with adaptations
the analysis of the litigation in the case prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling, which I originally addressed,
at different stages, in Calboli, ‘‘First Sale Rule in Copyright Law’’, supra note 3, at 85; and Calboli,
‘‘Corporate Strategies’’, supra note 3, at 233.
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Second Circuit on appeal ruled against Mr. Kirtsaeng and in favor of Wiley. In
particular, the District Court rejected the applicability of the first sale defense and
held that ‘‘[t]here is no indication that the imported books at issue here were
manufactured pursuant to the U.S. Copyright Act.’’34 In addition, the members of
the jury found that Mr. Kirtsaeng was liable for willful infringement and imposed a
stunning total of $600,000 in statutory damages.35 Mr. Kirtsaeng appealed, but a
divided Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling and concluded that
Section 109(a)’s ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ language indicated that the
principle of copyright exhaustion does not apply to copies of copyrighted works,
which have been manufactured abroad.36 Still, Mr. Kirtsaeng petitioned the
Supreme Court, which decided to grant certiorari.
The decision on appeal was particularly problematic because the Second
Circuit had relied on Quality King and interpreted the language ‘‘lawfully made
under this title’’ in Section 109(a) as ‘‘lawfully made in the United States.’’37
The Second Circuit had departed, in particular, from the position previously held
by the Ninth Circuit in Parfums Givenchy and following cases, in which the
Ninth Circuit supported that the principle of copyright exhaustion applied to all
copyrighted products after their first authorized domestic sale, regardless of
where the products were made. Instead, the Second Circuit followed a stricter
interpretation of the statutory language and stated that, ‘‘[w]hile perhaps a close
call … in light of its necessary interplay with Section 602(a)(1), Section 109(a) is
best interpreted as applying only to works manufactured domestically.’’ This
position was strongly criticized, however, including by a dissenting opinion in
the case authored by Judge Murtha.38 Like other critics, Judge Murtha
highlighted that, due to the large number of products manufactured abroad and
in circulation in the United States, the implications of the majority decision were
very problematic – as later stated by the Supreme Court itself, the decision could
lead to ‘‘a parade of horribles’’ if literally applied: that is, it would prohibit
retailers, consumers, and even libraries and museums, from reselling, lending, or
gifting foreign manufactured copyrighted products even after these products had
been lawfully acquired in the United States. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Murtha also noted that this could paradoxically incentivize businesses to relocate
their manufacturing facilities abroad to ‘‘escape’’ the application of the principle
of copyright exhaustion because their products would thus be foreign-made and
34 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, No. 08 Civ. 7834 (DCP), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96520, at 37
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009).
35 John Wiley & Sons Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 224 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that ‘‘[a]t trial the jury
awarded $75,000 in statutory damages per copyrighted work for Kirtsaeng’s willful infringement of eight
works’’).
36 Id. at 210.
37 Id. at 221 [relying on Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza
Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998)].
38 Id. at 224–29 (Murtha J. dissenting) (noting that an interpretation of the language ‘‘lawfully made
under this title’’ as ‘‘made in the United States’’ was incorrect since Sec. 109(a) of the Copyright Act does
not make reference to the place of manufacture of the products, but instead focuses on whether the
products are made ‘‘lawfully.’’).
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not locally-made.39 Something that, as Judge Murtha stated, could hardly have
been Congress’ intent when enacting Sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a).
In October 2012, amidst much expectation, the Supreme Court heard the oral
arguments in the case.40 From the very first questions, the Justices visibly struggled
in attempting to reconcile the outcome of the decision of the Second Circuit –
confirming that Section 109(a) applies only to domestically made products – with
Congress’ intent in enacting Sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a). Echoing the concerns
expressed by many parties, the Justices posited that Congress could not have
intended a ‘‘horrible’’ system wherein foreign manufactured goods would not be
subject to the principle of copyright exhaustion while domestically made products
would.41 Nevertheless, the Justices also showed reasonable concerns for the impact
that a broader interpretation of Section 109(a) – a shift toward a system of
international first sale in copyright law – could have on domestic businesses and
their ability to price products differently across different jurisdictions.42 Ultimately,
in March 2013, the Supreme Court issued its decision and, with a majority of 6–3
votes, reversed the Second Circuit’s decision finding in favor of Mr. Kirtsaeng.43 In
particular, in an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer for the majority, the Court
rejected any ‘‘geographical application’’ of Section 109(a). Instead, the Court held
that the foreign sales of copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad exhaust
the rights in these works.44 Against the position advocated by Wiley and other
publishers that ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ meant that copies had to be ‘‘made’’
in the United States, the opinion of the majority concluded that the language in
Section 109(a) does not, and cannot, refer to the actual place where the products are
manufactured. To the contrary, after a careful review of the legislative history of
Section 109(a) and the common law history of the principle of copyright exhaustion
as it was adopted by the Court in Bobbs-Merrill,45 Justice Breyer’s opinion adopted
the position that the language in Section 109(a) should be interpreted as referring to
any copies that have been ‘‘made’’ in a manner that meets the requirement of
national copyright law. In particular, Justice Breyer wrote that the wording
‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ ought to be interpreted as ‘‘made with the
permission of,’’ ‘‘in accordance with,’’ or ‘‘in compliance with’’ the copyright
owners,46 without any particular geographical limitation with respect to the actual
place where these copies are made and first sold, whether nationally or
internationally.
39 Id. at 226–27 (Murtha J. dissenting) (highlighting that it could not have been Congress’ intent to
provide more copyright protection to foreign goods than domestic ones).
40 Transcript of Oral Argument, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (S.Ct. argued Oct. 29,
2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-697.pdf.
41 Id. at 29–32.
42 Id. at 32.
43 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1358 (2013) (supporting that Sec.
109(a) establishes a defense against a copyright infringement claim based on unauthorized resale
‘‘where, as here, copies are manufactured abroad with the permission of the copyright owner.’’).
44 Id. at 1355–56.
45 Id. at 1363–64.
46 Id. at 1358.
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Besides dismissing Wiley’s reading of Section 109(a), Justice Breyer’s opinion
did not show much sympathy for the additional argument that a non-geographical
interpretation of the provision would derail the international pricing strategies of
American businesses – in other words, the possibility of price discrimination in
different countries. It was quite clear to the majority, Justice Breyer wrote, that a
‘‘non-geographical interpretation’’ of Section 109(a) would make it ‘‘difficult,
perhaps impossible for publishers (and other copyright holders) to divide foreign
and domestic markets.’’47 Specifically, ‘‘a publisher may find it more difficult to
charge different prices for the same book in different geographic markets.’’48 Yet,
the majority of the Justices could not find a ‘‘basic principle of copyright law that
suggests that publishers are especially entitled to such rights.’’49 To the contrary,
Justice Breyer’s opinion emphasized that, at least at the national level, market
segmentation was a practice inconsistent ‘‘with antitrust law that ordinarily forbids
market division.’’50 Moreover, Justice Breyer stated that Congress had enacted the
principle of copyright exhaustion following Bobbs-Merrill specifically to limit the
ability of copyright owners to divide markets,51 even though Congress did not
elaborate whether the market at issue was solely the domestic or also the
international market. Accordingly, nothing in the statute could be used, in the eyes
of the majority, to justify an interpretation of Section 109(a) along the lines
suggested by Wiley, that is, as a tool for market segmentation and price
discrimination across foreign markets. Justice Breyer additionally underlined that
the Solicitor General himself had stated that the consequences of affirming the
Second Circuit’s decision (i.e., affirming ‘‘perpetual downstream control’’ for
foreign made products) were worse than finding in favor of Mr. Kirtsaeng (i.e.,
ruling against the possibility of ‘‘restrict[ing] … market segmentation’’).52 Lastly,
the majority opinion rejected Wiley’s argument that a system of international
exhaustion was unprecedented in the United States. Instead, Justice Breyer noted
that the Court had already stated in Quality King that Section 109(a) ‘‘is a defense in
U.S. courts even when ‘the first sale occurred abroad’.’’53 Even though in Quality
King the Court had referred only to goods made domestically, exported, and later
reimported into the United States, the Court’s precedent in Quality King had already
‘‘significantly eroded’’ the possibility that Section 109(a) only applies to national
sales.54 Ultimately, following the majority opinion in Kirtsaeng, the parade of
‘‘horribles’’ that could have derived from a Wiley victory was avoided – Americans
could continue to safely host garage sales and sell their used foreign made
47 Id. at 1370.
48 Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1370.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1371.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1371. Justice Breyer stated, specifically, that ‘‘our holding in Quality King that
§ 109(a) is a defense in U.S. courts even when ‘the first sale occurred abroad’ has already significantly
eroded such principle.’’ Id. (citation omitted).
54 Id.
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copyrighted articles, libraries could continue to lend foreign printed books, and so
on.
4 The Concurrent and Dissenting Opinions in Kirtsaeng: Setting the Stage
for a ‘‘Return’’ to National Exhaustion?
Undoubtedly, while retailers, parallel importers, consumer associations, libraries,
and museums celebrated the happy ending of Mr. Kirtsaeng’s story, the decision of
the Supreme Court sent chilling waves across the boardrooms of multinational
corporations, publishers, and the entertainment industry. Most likely, the decision in
Kirtsaeng also sent chilling waves throughout the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), whose official position on copyright exhaustion for the
purpose of negotiating FTAs with other countries continued to be ‘‘national
exhaustion,’’ at least for foreign manufactured products, also post Quality-King.
This position, for example, was adopted in the FTAs with Morocco55 and Jordan56
and was more recently advocated as part of the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP).57 Still, as I noted earlier, the opinion of the majority
was not the only opinion issued by the Justices in the case. Instead, a concurring and
a dissenting opinion were also issued in the case as additional reminders of the
internal divisions within the Court and the tensions that continued, and continue to
surround the territorial application of the principle of copyright exhaustion in the
United States. Accordingly, as these additional opinions also seem to indicate, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kirtsaeng may not necessarily be the last chapter in the
decade-long saga on the interpretation of Section 109(a) and the interplay between
Sections 109(a) and 602(1)(a).
In particular, Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Alito, submitted a concurring
opinion in Kirtsaeng wherein she explained that the majority decision was necessary
in light of the Court’s previous decision in Quality King.58 Yet, the concurring
Justices did not seem fully convinced that Congress’ intent in enacting Sec-
tion 109(a) was that of establishing a principle of international copyright
exhaustion. More remarkably, they stated that now that the majority opinion in
55 Article 15.5(2), United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44
I.L.M. 544 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_
Text-Section_Index.html.
56 Article 4(11), Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (2002),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5112.
pdf.
57 See Articles QQ.G.3 and QQ.G.17 Trans-Pacific Partnership, Intellectual Property [Rights] Chapter,
Consolidated Text, Aug. 2013, available at https://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-
treaty-IP-chapter.pdf [hereinafter TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013]. As indicated in this draft, the United
States opposes a system of international copyright exhaustion and proposes national exhaustion for
negotiating members of the TPP. The TPP is currently being negotiated between Australia, Brunei
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the
United States.
58 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1372–73 (2013) (Kagan J. concurring).
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Kirtsaeng had rectified the discriminatory application of the principle of copyright
exhaustion that had resulted from Quality King59 (neither Justice Kagan nor Justice
Alito were sitting on the Court when it decided Quality King), Congress could step
in and provide a comprehensive review of the principle of copyright exhaustion in
the United States, including its territorial application. In particular, the concurring
opinion highlighted that, as a result of the majority decision, the application of
Section 602(1)(a) and the importation right granted to copyright owners had been
‘‘unavoidably diminish[ed]… to a fairly esoteric set of applications’’60 and went on
to suggest that, should this result not satisfy Congress, Congress could review the
provision of Section 602(1)(a) and the application of copyright exhaustion to
imported products in general.61 In particular, Justice Kagan wrote that ‘‘if Congress
thinks copyright owners need greater power to restrict importation and thus divide
markets, a ready solution is at hand’’—to clarify in the statute that Section 602(a)(1)
applies to all products imported into the United States.62 Still, Justice Kagan
advocated that, should Congress decide to restrict the importation of products sold
abroad, Congress should also clarify that the same rule applies to all products,
regardless of the place of manufacturing, so as to avoid any future risk of
discrimination between the products that are imported in the United States. In
particular, the concurring opinion clearly opposed a discriminatory application of
Section 109(a) only to products made in the United States as the Court had
previously supported in Quality King. This position, Justice Kagan wrote, would
ultimately ‘‘impos[e] downstream liability on those who purchase and resell in the
United States copies that happen to have been manufactured abroad.’’63 Justice
Kagan concluded that Congress’ action should instead ‘‘target importers alone’’ and
not the ‘‘the ‘libraries, used-book dealers, technology companies, consumer-goods
retailers, and museums’ with whom the Court today is rightly concerned.’’64
Besides Justice Kagan’s concurrence, Justice Ginsburg also issued an opinion in
the case, and this time, she dissented with the majority, joined by Justice Kennedy in
full and by Justice Scalia in part.65 Notably, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion repeated the
position that the Justice had supported in her concurring opinion in Quality King –
that copyright law is based on the territoriality principle and that the sale in one
country of a copyrighted product does not exhaust the right of the copyright owner
to control the distribution of that product in another country.66 Based upon this
premise, Justice Ginsburg stated that the majority’s interpretation of Sec-
tion 109(a) in Kirtsaeng was ‘‘at odds with Congress’ aim to protect copyright
owners against the unauthorized importation of low-priced, foreign-made copies of
59 Id. at 1372 (Kagan J. concurring).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Kirtsaeng, 133 S.Ct. at 1372 (Kagan J. concurring) (emphasis added).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1373 (Ginsburg J. dissenting).
66 Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 153 (1998) (Ginsburg J.
concurring).
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their copyrighted works.’’67 She also seemed to suggest that the petitioner and the
majority had exaggerated the ‘‘parade of horribles’’ that a reading of Sec-
tion 109(a) as suggested by Wiley would have on retailers, museums, and
manufacturers. Instead, she emphasized that if the Court had applied the Quality
King analysis in the case, the outcome would have favored Wiley because ‘‘lawfully
made under [Title 17]’’ is a prerequisite for application of Section 109(a). Since the
copies in question were not ‘‘lawfully made under [Title 17],’’ Section 109(a) would
not apply because Kirtsaeng’s unauthorized imports would have been correctly
considered as infringing copies under Section 602(a)(1).68 Justice Ginsburg also
noted, correctly, that the position of the majority in the case was in conflict with the
position repeatedly taken by the United States in international trade agreements, that
copyright owners should have the right ‘‘to prevent the unauthorized importation of
copies of their work sold abroad.’’69
Ultimately, based on the language of both the concurring and the dissenting
opinions, it did not come as a surprise that, within just a few days of the issuing
of the decision in Kirtsaeng, calls for copyright reforms started to be heard.
Perhaps only a (nevertheless remarkable) coincidence, on March 20, 2013, Maria
Pallante, the United States Register of Copyrights, publicly stated that the time
had come for Congress to undertake necessary copyright reforms and bring
American copyright law in line with the challenges of the twenty-first century.70
A few weeks later, in April 2013, Representative Goodlatte responded to this call
and announced that Congress was considering a major and comprehensive review
of the Copyright Act.71 Hearings on comprehensive copyright reforms started in
67 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1373 (2013) (Ginsburg J. dissenting) (noting
that ‘‘the Court’s bold departure from Congress’ design is all the more stunning, for it places the United
States at the vanguard of the movement of ‘‘international exhaustion’’ of copyrights – a movement that
the United States has steadfastly resisted on the world stage’’).
68 Id. at 1377.
69 Id. at 1384. The United States was in fact one of the countries supporting the principle of national
exhaustion (at least for patents and copyrights) during the negotiations leading to the adoption of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in 1994 – for lack of
consensus among TRIPs members, TRIPs finally left members free to adopt their preferred position on
the issue. See Art. 6, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Result
of the Uruguay Rounds Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 83 (1994). Article 6 provides that nothing in the Agreement
can ‘‘be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.’’ See also S.K. Verma,
‘‘Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreements’’, 29 IIC
534, 539 (1998). See also supra notes 55–57.
70 Maria Pallante testified, on March 20, 2013, before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property and the Internet, urging Congress to considering comprehensive legislation reforms. See
Statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights of the United States, Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property and the Internet Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives
113th Congress, 1st Session March 20, 2013, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/
03202013/Pallante%20032013.pdf).
71 On April 24, 2013, the House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) announced that
the Judiciary Committee will conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. copyright law over the coming
months. The announcement is available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2013/04242013_2.html.
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May 2013 and are ongoing in Congress at this time.72 Although Ms. Pallante or
Mr. Goodlatte did not single out the decision in Kirtsaeng, the issue of the
territorial application of copyright exhaustion certainly remains an important part
of a possible proposal on copyright reforms. In particular, as advocated by Justice
Kagan’s concurring opinion, Congress will certainly discuss the post-Kirtsaeng
application of the importation rights as per Section 602(1)(a), which now
essentially applies only to counterfeited products. It also remains a fact that the
position supported by the United States at the international level and adopted in
several FTAs no longer aligns with the post-Kirtsaeng interpretation of
Sections 109(a) and 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act.73 Thus, calls to realign
national law with the international obligations that the United States has taken
may also soon be starting and ultimately push Congress to overrule Kirtsaeng to
comply with those obligations.
5 Conclusion
After decades of controversies and uncertainty, the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng
provided clear guidance on the territorial application of the principle of copyright
exhaustion in the United States. Specifically, it clarified in Kirtsaeng that the
language ‘‘lawfully made under this title’’ in Section 109(a) should not be read as
‘‘made in the United States’’ but rather as ‘‘made with the permission of,’’ ‘‘in
accordance with,’’ or ‘‘in compliance with’’ the copyright owners. Still, only time
will tell whether the Supreme Court’s decision will survive possible copyright
reforms or whether Congress will overturn the decision in the near future. For the
time being, Kirtsaeng’s clear shift towards an ‘‘open border’’ trade in copyrighted
products undoubtedly remains good news for consumers and independent
distributors, libraries and museums. Thanks to the rise of wholesale and discount
stores and the increased ease with which products can be purchased online in a
foreign country, cheaper products can now ‘‘lawfully’’ be imported into the United
States, and consumers may benefit from the additional competition that these
products create for copyright owners. Besides the United States market, the
decision in Kirtsaeng also represents a positive development for free trade in
general. Since the United States now follows a principle of international copyright
exhaustion, it has become more challenging for the USTR (lobbied by copyright
owners) to demand that other countries shift their domestic copyright policies
from international to national exhaustion – this request was made, for example, to
New Zealand, Singapore, and other countries with respect to the ongoing TPP
72 On May 16, 2013, the House Judiciary Committee held the first hearing on ‘‘A Case Study for
Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles Project.’’ Materials, witness list and statements, and the
statement of Chairman Bob Goodlatte are available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/hear_
05162013.html.
73 See supra notes 55–57.
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negotiations.74 Yet, precisely because these overall (negative in the view of
copyright owners) effects of Kirtsaeng on copyright owners’ global marketing and
pricing schemes, copyright owners’ lobbying pressure to convince Congress to
overrule Kirtsaeng will certainly grow stronger in future months. In the long term,
it will certainly become harder and harder for Congress to resist this pressure.
Still, even in the instance that Congress would not overrule Kirtsaeng,
copyright owners would certainly resort to alternative means to (continue to)
secure control over the distribution of their products across national borders.
Notably, changes in business practices and technology advancement in the past
decades have already eroded the application of the principle of copyright
exhaustion, not only with respect to cross border trade, but also for products
circulating within national markets. Licensing agreements – one of the most
common types of contracts for distribution chains and franchises involving
intellectual property rights – frequently include clauses prohibiting licensees from
further distributing copyrighted products, and the violation of these clauses
amounts to breach of contract. Likewise, sales of copyrighted products such as,
for example software, music, or books are increasingly combined with clauses
restricting products’ subsequent re-sale, and again those who do not respect these
clauses could be liable under contract law.75 Even though these clauses may not
pass the scrutiny of antitrust law and be found anticompetitive, it is undeniable
that these clauses have become common practice in the business world as an
alternative means to control product distribution in the market place. Besides
contractual measures, technical measures have also become ubiquitous as an
alternative instrument to partition national and international markets. These
measures include, for instance, digital rights management (DRM) measures such
as ‘‘unlocking codes’’ to access software or videogames, which are often given
only to the initial buyers or can otherwise restrict the transfer of the copyrighted
products at issue.76 In addition, differences in national standards (regional DVD
74 New Zealand adopts, since 1998, the principle of international copyright exhaustion. See Copyright
(Removal of Prohibition on Parallel Importing) Amendment Act 1998, Publication Act 1998 No. 20, May
19, 1998, available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1998/0020/latest/DLM426040.html. In
2003, New Zealand introduced some limitations to this principle, in favor of films, due to pressure from
the United States. See Alberto Cerda, ‘‘USTR New Exclusive Right for Copyright Holders: Importation
Provision in the TPPA’’, Knowledge Ecology International, July 5, 2011, available at http://keionline.org/
node/1176. Similarly, Singapore follows the principle of international copyright exhaustion. See Singa-
pore Copyright Act of 1987, Secs. 32, 25(3) (Sing.) (as amended by the Copyright Amendment Act of
1994). The Amendment followed a leading decision of the Singapore Court of Appeals issued by the
Chief Justice of Singapore in the case PP v. Teo Ai Nee. See PP v. Teo Ai Nee, 1 SLR 452 (1994). See
also Ng-Loy (2004). Should the TPP ultimately impose national obligations to permit copyright owners to
prevent gray market goods, New Zealand and Singapore could be obliged to review their current law
altogether. See TPP IP Chapter Draft Aug. 2013, supra note 57.
75 See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that software can be sold
subject to contract provisions restricting further transfers).
76 For a detailed summary of the alternative tools that copyright owners have to circumvent the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng, see Eric Goldman, ‘‘The Supreme Court’s First Sale Ruling Will Spur
Price Competition in the Short Run, But Enjoy It While It Lasts’’, Forbes, March 20, 2013, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/20/the-supreme-courts-first-sale-ruling-will-spur-price-
competition-in-the-short-run-but-enjoy-it-while-it-lasts/.
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codes for instance) or national languages can also nullify the effects of
international copyright exhaustion – parallel importers may no longer be legally
liable for importing DVDs from Italy into the United States, for example, yet they
have little incentive to do so because these DVDs cannot be played by most DVD
players in the United States homes; likewise, parallel importers may not find it
economically convenient to import foreign printed books in a foreign language
due to the limited demand for those books in the United States.
In conclusion, even in the case that Kirtsaeng survives future copyright reforms,
copyright owners could still reduce the impact of the decision by relying on
alternative, legal and technology-related instruments. Copyright owners are well
aware of these alternative means and will certainly continue to plan their
distribution strategies to prevent as much as possible gray market products, not
only into the United States but generally across the globe. Copyright owners have
too much at stake (in their views) to abandon the fight against the international
arbitrage of their copyrighted products sold in foreign national markets. Likewise,
parallel importers and countries (developing and developed) that could benefit from
parallel trade and ‘‘open border’’ national trade policies will certainly continue to
turn to national courts (or even to competition law national authorities), requesting
that courts rule in their favor against copyright owners. In the United States, in
particular, it would thus not come as a surprise that more chapters may still be
awaiting to be written by Congress and/or the judiciary in this decade-long
American saga on the territorial application of the principle of copyright exhaustion.
At least for the time being, however, gray marketers and consumers can nonetheless
enjoy the (positive for this author) effects of Kirtsaeng in the United States as well
as in foreign markets currently following the principle of international exhaustion
(despite the pressure of the USTR to modify their stance on the issue).
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